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IN RECENT YEARS the standard  view of the inflation  process  has become 
complicated  by the realization  that inflationary  bursts  can emanate  from 
supp'y  as well as from  demand  disturbances.  Supply-side  disturbances,  re- 
flected  mainly  in rising  food and oil prices,  generated  sharp  increases  in 
general  price levels in most countries  of the world during  the 1973-75 
period. The impact in the United States was magnified  by wage-price 
catch-ups  after  the ending  of controls,  the productivity  slowdown,  the de- 
cline  in the dollar,  and a number  of legislative  measures  resulting  in higher 
costs and  prices.  More recently,  the decline  of oil production  in Iran and 
rising  farm  prices  are  kindling  fears  of new  supply-shock  inflation. 
Price shocks  from the supply side differ  from traditional  demand-pull 
disturbances  because  they can occur even at low levels of aggregate  de- 
mand.  Indeed,  both theory  and data suggest  that supply  shocks  are more 
likely  to be associated  with  recessions  than  with  booms.  Because  this  is so, 
standard  remedies  for dealing  with supply-side  inflation  are not readily 
apparent.  Most economists  now more  or less agree  that  aggregate  demand 
policy should  not permit  unemployment  to fall below its natural,  or non- 
accelerating-inflation,  rate  for any  length  of time.  But whether  unemploy- 
ment should  be allowed  to rise above  its natural  rate  in the presence  of a 
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price  shock  from  the supply  side-and  by how much and  for how long- 
is a much more difficult  question.  At one extreme,  macro policy could 
"accommodate"  the shock,  using either  monetary  or fiscal  policy to shift 
the aggregate  demand  schedule  in an expansionary  direction,  maintain  un- 
employment  at its initial  rate, and accept  whatever  inflation  might  ensue 
in the process.  At the other  extreme,  monetary  and  fiscal  policy could be 
used in an attempt  to engineer  a recession  sufficiently  deep to extinguish 
the shock-induced  inflation  promptly.  Somewhere  in the middle  would  be 
a class of macro policies aimed at a constant  or adjusted  growth  path 
for nominal  income. Under these compromise  policies the higher  price 
levels induced  by the shock (when spending  demands  are inelastic) will 
imply a temporary  period of both unemployment  and inflation,  lasting 
until the higher  unemployment  sufficiently  reduces  wage and  price  levels 
throughout  the economy to permit  a return  to the preshock  unemploy- 
ment rate. The choice between policies depends  on whether  the social 
costs  of the  greater  inflation  generated  or permitted  by the accommodating 
macro  policy outweigh  the social costs of the greater  inflation  and unem- 
ployment  generated  by any of the nonaccommodating  strategies.  Ironi- 
cally,  this  raises  the old question  of how to choose  between  more  inflation 
and  more  unemployment,  even  in a view of the inflation  process  that  may 
allow  no long-term  trade-off  between  the  two. 
In this paper  I analyze  and  compare  these policy choices.  The aim  is to 
summarize  and pinpoint the implications  of various models of supply 
shocks  and the inflationary  process,  without  advancing  a particular  point 
of view. The paper  begins  with a review  of two recent  models  of supply- 
shock  price  increases,  one developed  by Gordon  and  one by Phelps.l  These 
models deal primarily  with the impact  of supply  shocks on employment 
and price levels and give only partial  attention  to inflation  rates and the 
feedback  process.  So I extend the models to include what Perry  calls a 
"mainline  model"  of the inflation  process,  featuring  a price  markup  equa- 
tion and a wage-adjustment  Phillips  curve  with both a price-wage  and a 
wage-wage  feedback mechanism.2  The model is  solved to  determine 
the conditions  under  which accommodating  and nonaccommodating  re- 
1. Robert J.  Gordon, "Alternative Responses of  Policy  to  External Supply 
Shocks,"  BPEA, 1:1975, pp. 183-204; and Edmund S. Phelps, "Commodity-Supply 
Shock and Full-Employment Monetary Policy," Journal of  Money,  Credit and 
Banking,  vol. 10 (May 1978), pp. 206-21. 
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sponses  would  be appropriate.  It is then fitted  empirically  and simulated 
in the traditional  way to measure  the degree  of inflation  and unemploy- 
ment  generated  by various  macro  strategies  in response  to a price shock. 
Because  the desirability  of these outcomes  depends  on the relative  social 
costs of inflation  and unemployment,  I then try to value these relative 
costs. Some attempts  to estimate  them based on the work of others are 
compared  with the normative  implications  of my own model, and with 
inferences  based  on survey  data.  Sensitivity  tests are also made  to see how 
the desirability  of various  strategies  is altered  when  the parameters  of the 
model  change  and when different  conceptions  of the social costs of infla- 
tion  and  unemployment  are  adopted. 
Up to this point  the model  used  to analyze  price  shocks  and  the simula- 
tion of this model are  based  on relatively  standard  techniques.  To round 
out the story, I  also investigate the question of  how supply shocks 
might  be analyzed  in some of the newer  expectations-oriented  theories  of 
the inflation process-the  game-of-strategy  view of  Fellner and the 
rational-expectations  views of Lucas, Sargent  and Wallace,  Barro, and 
others.3 
As a final  prefatory  comment,  I note that  the entire  paper  deals  with  the 
macro  response  to price  shocks,  with no discussion  of how shocks  might 
be prevented  from  occurring.  One conclusion  of the paper  is that  whether 
shocks  generate  lingering  future  inflation  or current  and  future  unemploy- 
ment,  they  can have  large  social  costs.  There  would  then  be great  potential 
gains  in any microeconomic  supply-management  measures  that could be 
designed  to prevent  shocks,  or tax adjustments  intended  to neutralize  their 
initial  impact  on overall  price  levels.  But  the details  of how these  measures 
should  be constructed  raise issues that are much more industry-specific 
than  are  the issues discussed  here.  Despite  their  importance,  I simply  will 
not address  those  questions  in this  paper.4 
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(April 1972), pp. 103-24; Thomas J. Sargent and Neil Wallace, "'Rational' Expec- 
tations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," 
Journal of Political Economy, vol.  83  (April  1975),  pp. 241-54;  and Robert J. 
Barro, "Unanticipated  Money Growth and Unemployment in the United States," 
American  Economic Review, vol. 67 (March 1977), pp. 101-15. 
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The  Theory  of Supply  Shocks,  Price  Levels,  and  Inflation  Rates 
Two papers  model the relationship  between  supply  shocks  and  overall 
output,  price,  and employment  levels. The Gordon  model is a two-sector 
one in which  output  is exogenous  in one sector  called the "farm"  sector; 
prices  in it are  set to equilibrate  demand  and  supply;  and  overall  price  and 
output levels are then determined  by the degree  of accommodation  im- 
plicit in the macro  policy response.5  Phelps'  model contains  one sector, 
with  the exogenous  supply  of raw  materials  as one component  of an aggre- 
gate production  function  that has the usual properties  of concavity  and 
linear  homogeneity.6  Gordon  considers  one case  in which  prices  and  wages 
are perfectly  flexible  and  one in which  they are completely  inflexible,  but 
the standard  case for both models  allows  for some  upward  adjustment  in 
aggregate  price  levels as output  and  employment  increase.  Hence  the solu- 
tion,  of the price and wage sectors  of the model (given by the aggregate 
supply  line,  AS, in the diagram  below) is upward  sloping.  Under  Gordon's 
assumptions,  at any  level of real  aggregate  employment,  the exogenous  de- 
cline  in farm  supplies  raises  farm  and  overall  prices,  hence  shifting  up the 
aggregate  supply  schedule  to AS'; under  Phelps'  assumptions,  the scarcity 
of materials  lowers labor's marginal  product and, with a fixed money 
wage, shifts  up marginal  costs and prices  to AS'. 
The aggregate  demand  schedule  for  both  models  represents  the  solution 
of the  IS and  LM equations  and  is shown  as the downward  sloping  AD line 
in the diagram.  The standard  rationale  for this slope is that the nominal 
quantity  of money, M, is fixed along the schedule and will support a 
higher  level of aggregate  demand  for labor  when  prices,  P, are lower and 
the real money stock is greater.  This rationale  works only when the IS 
curve is downward  sloping and the LM upward  sloping. The argument 
could  be made  slightly  more  general  and  much  more  realistic  by specifying 
in addition  that  all government  expenditures  are  indexed  but  that  progres- 
sive  income  tax schedules  are  written  in nominal  terms,  so that  when  prices 
fall, real taxes  fall and  aggregate  demand  for labor  again  increases. 
The impact on output and employment  of a supply shock in either 
model is found by shifting  the aggregate  supply  curve  as shown,  yielding 
temporarily  a positive  correlation  between  inflation  (dP/P > 0) and  un- 
5. Gordon, "Alternative  Responses of Policy to External Supply Shocks." 
6. Phelps, "Commodity-Supply  Shock." Edward M. Gramlich  129 





N1  N-  Employment  rate, N 
employment  (N < N*, where  N* is the normal  high-employment  rate). 
The new short-run  equilibrium  will be at (P1, N1) unless one of several 
events  occurs. 
First,  there  could  be an endogenous  shift  in the AD schedule.  The pos- 
sibility  is raised  by Phelps,  and  the shift could be either  upward  (limiting 
the employment  decline  but raising  the price  level further)  or downward 
(magnifying  the employment  decrease  but  limiting  the  price  increase).  An 
upward  or outward shift can result because the marginal  and average 
products  of labor are  reduced  by the materials  shortage;  full employment 
output  is reduced;  and  thus  the money  demanded  at full employment  may 
be reduced.  A downward  or inward  shift can occurbecause  the shortage 
of materials  also reduces  the marginal  product  of capital  and  real  interest 
rates,  hence  tending  to raise  money  demand  at full employment.  It is diffi- 
cult to tell which effect  will predominate,  but using  reasonable  values of 
money-demand  elasticities,  Phelps establishes  that  there  will be some re- 
duction  in employment  and  increase  in the  price  level-that  is, any  vertical 
upward  shift  of the AD schedule  will be less than  that of the AS schedule. 
Second, policy could accommodate  the shocks by  shifting  the AD 130  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
schedule  sufficiently  to maintain  N = N*, in the process  raising  prices  to 
P2. 
Third,  the initial change  in prices  in any of these scenarios  could en- 
gender expectations  of further  changes, hence superimposing  dynamic 
inflationary  reactions  on the comparative  static  model. To deal with this 
problem  it is necessary  to combine  the Gordon-Phelps  analysis  with an 
explicit  model of the inflationary  process.  Initially  I use the standard  or 
mainline  view, in which  wage setters  agree  on their contracts  in an eco- 
nomic  environment  characterized  by a state  of demand  in the  labor  market 
and a history  of past rates  of increase  of both wages and  prices.  There  is 
broad  agreement  that  the inverse  function  of the  unemployment  rate,  U-', 
serves  well as the demand  proxy,  but not much agreement  about  how or 
why the past rates of wage or price increases  should enter the analysis. 
The standard  textbook  treatment  introduces  these  terms  through  an adap- 
tive expectations  process:  workers  base wage  behavior  on some  notion  of 
expected  price changes,  which are in turn  related  to past price changes. 
In contrast,  Perry  views the process  in terms  of inertia  and catch-ups  of 
wages and prices.7  Nor is there agreement  on whether  the increases  to 
which money wages are responding  are those of prices, as in the more 
common  view of the world  that  invokes  cost-of-living  escalation,  or other 
wages,  as in the  view  described  by Hall,  which  assumes  a competitive  labor 
market.8 
Without  taking  sides, it is possible to write an expression  for a gen- 
eralized  expectations  or inertia  Phillips  curve  incorporating  both a price- 
wage and a wage-wage  feedback  mechanism, 
(1)  w =  ao +  ajU-1 +  a2L(w) +  a3L(p), 
where  p and  w refer  to the percentage  rate  of change  of prices and  wages, 
respectively,  and  the L operator  signifies  some distributed  lag on previous 
changes.  This  model  implies  a short-run  trade-off  between  unemployment, 
U, and inflation,  but a long-run  trade-off  if the sum of the expectations- 
inertia coefficients  a2 +  a3 is unity and if these wage changes are fully 
passed  through  into price  changes. 
For the price equation,  the standard  model implies  that  prices  are de- 
termined  by a proportionate  markup  over costs. To address  the issue of 
7.  Perry,  "Slowing  the Wage-Price  Spiral." 
8.  Robert E.  Hall,  "The Process of  Inflation in  the  Labor Market," BPEA, 
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the extent to which exogenous  increases  in materials  costs are passed 
through  into  the  inflation  process,  the expression  is written 
(2)  p  = a4 +  a5w +  a6pc, 
where  P. is the exogenous  percentage  rate of change  of materials  prices 
and  a, is the  negative  of the  percentage  rate  of increase  of output  per  factor 
unit (labor plus materials). Measures  for indirect  taxes and the cost of 
capital  goods  are  omitted  for the sake  of simplicity:  if they  change  propor- 
tionately  with wages and materials  prices, a5 +  a6 should equal unity; 
otherwise  the sum of a5 and a6  should  be less than  unity.9  While  p, is the 
only explicit  supply-shock  term  in the equation,  it should  be understood 
that  any  shift  in the expression,  say through  a productivity  slowdown,  will 
have a similar  impact on inflation  and unemployment  and the response 
should  be the same  as it would  be for a shock. 
The model can be  solved by substituting  equation 1 into 2  and 
solving  recursively  backward.  Two assumptions  can be made  about  Pc- 
either  that the entire  rate of change  of materials  prices  is exogenous,  or 
that  only the relative  rate  of change  of materials  prices,  p', is exogenous, 
where  p=  p  +  p'. Taking  first  the latter  assumption,  and assuming  in 
addition  that lags in the wage equation  last one period,  that  a2 + a3 <  1, 
and that a5 +  a6 =  1, yields an expression for the reduced-form inflation 
equation: 
(3a)  a,(1 - a2)  ?  aoa +  (-  a5~  )3aP  a5(1  -a3-  a2)  +  a5)  P 
+  a3 (1  a5)  E  (a3 +  a2)i-p'_j  +  a, E  (a3 +  a2)iU_l.  +  3 
a5  i=1  i_=o 
As a2  + a3  approaches  unity,  so that  the long-run  unemployment-inflation 
trade-off  vanishes,  any previous  level of U will have some impact  on the 
current  inflation  rate. Moreover,  if there is some price-wage  feedback 
mechanism  (a3 > 0), any previous  price shock  will lead to some current 
inflation.  But if either  of these conditions  is not fulfilled,  the inflationary 
impact  of price shocks will gradually  diminish.  These shocks will alter 
inflation  rates in the short run, but they will not do so in the long run. 
Exactly  how long the inflationary  impact  of a shock  will persist  then be- 
comes  an  empirical  question  depending  on a2  and  a3. 
9.  In Gordon's most recent estimate of his structural  price equation, the terms 
I have omitted did not have statistically significant  coefficients. See Robert J. Gor- 
don, "Can  the Inflation  of the 1970s Be Explained?"  BPEA, 1:1977, pp. 253-79. 132  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
The second  way to solve the model  is to take the entire  rate  of change 
of materials  prices,  pc, as exogenous.  The equation  becomes 
(3b) p _a4(1 -  a2) +  a0a5  +  (1 -  a5)p 
+  (1 -  a5)a5a3 E  (a5a3 +  a2)i-'p0_  +  a5a,  E  (a5a3 +  a2)iLUT2 
i=1  i=O 
The condition  for the long-term  trade-off  to vanish  and  for shocks  to per- 
sist now becomes a5a3  +  a2  =  1. Because a5 will undoubtedly be close to 
unity,  no large  practical  difference  exists  between  this  form  of the solution 
and  that  given  in equation  3a, but in this solution  the  price-wage  feedback 
coefficient  (a3 >  0)  now has two effects. In addition  to providing  the 
vehicle  for shocks  to be incorporated  into the inflationary  process,  it also 
makes the model slightly  less accelerationist  because now wage changes 
are slightly  diluted  every time they feed through  the price equation  and 
then back into further  wage changes.  If the feedback  mechanism  were of 
the wage-wage  variety  (a, =  1, a3 =  0), this dampening  would not exist 
and  the model  would  remain  accelerationist  even  for a5 <  1. 
Equation  3a or 3b provides  the  reduced-form  solution  of the  price-wage 
sector. The next task is to use these equations  to find  the optimal  policy 
response  to a shock. This is done by finding  the minimum  value for the 
loss function, 
(4)  SC  =  2  <  pi +  b  ui' 
where  SC is social cost; t is the policymaking  horizon;  r. is the social dis- 
count  rate  used  to value  future  inflation;  r, is that  rate  used  to value  future 
unemployment  (not necessarily  the same  discount  rate); and b is the all- 
important  parameter  representing  the  social  cost  of unemployment  relative 
to that  of inflation. 
The optimal  response  to a price shock can be found by substituting 
either  of the reduced-form  expressions,  say equation  3a into 4, taking  de- 
rivatives  with respect  to unemployment  (the variable  most directly  con- 
trolled  by macro  policy), and solving  the model. If the policy horizon  is 
assumed  to be infinite,  this  procedure  yields  a set of equations  of the form: 
(5)  uo  =  a,(,  ~+  rp)  (5)  UO  =  jb(1  +  r  -a2-  a3) 
v 
. 
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In this  solution,  the  general  level of all unemployment  rates  depends  posi- 
tively on the short-run  impact of unemployment  on inflation,  al, and 
negatively  on the relative social cost of unemployment,  b. Even if the 
model  is accelerationist  (a2 +  a3 =  1), the presence of discounting  will 
yield a general analytic  solution for the unemployment  path.'0  And as 
long as the discount  rates  are  the same (ru =  rn), the optimal  path  implies 
that all unemployment  rates are the same-that  is, that shocks are to be 
fully accommodated.  Macro  policy should  move the unemployment  rate 
to its optimal  level (the nonaccelerating-inflation  rate of unemployment 
in the accelerationist  case) and  hold  it there,  with  or without  shock. 
The question  of whether  or not to accommodate  the shock then be- 
comes  interesting  whenever  any  of the assumptions  of this simple  exercise 
are  not fulfilled: 
First, if the policy horizon  is not infinite  but finite,  it will be desirable 
to eliminate  the shock-induced  inflation  before  some  arbitrary  date.  In this 
case, because the inflation-fighting  impact  of unemployment  in the near 
term is more valuable,  there should be a temporary  recession,  and the 
shock  will not be fully accommodated."l 
Second,  if the relative  cost of unemployment,  b, declines  as inflation 
rises, a shock will raise the optimal unemployment  rate at the time it 
occurs,  again  implying  a less than  fully accommodating  policy. 
Third, if any parameters  of the model are not constant  but depend 
either on the state of the economy or some perception  of government 
policy, nonaccommodative  responses  may become optimal. 
And fourth,  if the economy  was initially  in a state  of overemployment, 
a shock could trigger  an adjustment  to a new higher  unemployment  rate 
and appear  to signal  a nonaccommodative  policy response. 
The  next  sections  of the  paper  investigate  these  matters. 
A Standard  Empirical  Model  of the  Inflation  Process 
I begin  by fitting  a standard  model  of the inflation  process.  The model 
contains  four sections.  The first  uses standard  formulations  of wage and 
10. Modigliani and Papademos  also discuss this issue; see Franco Modigliani and 
Lucas Papademos, "Optimal  Demand Policies against Stagflation,"  Weltwirtschaft- 
lichesArchiv, vol. 114 (December 1978), pp. 736-82. 
11. This is the same principle expressed in my previous work; see Edward M. 
Gramlich, "The Optimal  Timing of Unemployment in a Recession,"  BPEA, 1:1975, 
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price  adjustment  to determine  the past  historical  relationship  between  in- 
flation  and  unemployment;  the second  estimates,  in several  different  ways, 
the key relative  cost parameter  in the social loss function;  and the third 
estimates  the apparent  serial  correlation,  if any, of price  shocks.  The  final 
section  of the model, consisting  only of identities,  shows  how the various 
accommodating  and nonaccommodating  policy responses are to  be 
defined. 
THE  INFLATION-UNEMPLOYMENT  RELATIONSHIP 
The standard  mainline  model  of the  inflation  process  features  a Phillips- 
curve  wage equation  similar  to equation 1 and a price markup  equation 
similar  to 2. Both are fit to annual  data over the 1954-77 period.  Begin- 
ning with the former,  I define w as the percentage  change in average 
hourly  earnings  adjusted  to exclude  overtime  and interindustry  shifts, U 
as the unemployment  rate using constant (1966)  wage-weighted  demo- 
graphic  proportions  of the labor  force, and  p as the rate of inflation  in the 
consumer  price  index.  The equation  is 
(1')  w =-0.394  +  6.895  U-1 +  0.3189 p-i 
(-0.4)  (3.4)  (2.9) 
+  0.4041 w-, +  0.1347 w-2, 
(1.7)  (0.7) 
1R2 =  0.834;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.74; standard error  =  0.675. 
The figures  in parentheses  here and in subsequent  equations  are t-statis- 
tics. 
This equation  is quite similar  to that estimated  by Perry  for the pre- 
controls  period.'2  Adding  the  last  six years  of turbulent  data  has  succeeded 
in lowering  the unemployment  coefficient  only slightly,  and  has raised  the 
price-wage  feedback  coefficient  from  Perry's  0.21 to 0.32. The cyclical  in- 
fluence  of unemployment  on wage  changes  is similar  to that  found  in most 
wage-adjustment  equations  estimated  in the past decade.  Also, as is com- 
mon currently,  the model is nearly  accelerationist,  with the feedback  co- 
efficients  summing  to 0.86, slightly  more than one-third  of which is at- 
tributable  to cost-of-living  escalation  and  the remainder  to wage  catch-up 
escalation.  Dummies  for the controls  period  and a post-controls  catch-up 
12. Perry, "Slowing the Wage-Price Spiral," p. 277,  equation 3.  In both this 
equation and in 2', I use one hundred  times the change in the natural log of a vari- 
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were  tried  in other  versions  of the equation  and  did not change  the results 
greatly,  with  one important  exception.  There  is some  collinearity  between 
the catch-up  dummy (with a value of one in  1974 and 1975)  and the 
lagged  price-inflation  term,  for the obvious  reason  that the post-controls 
period  was  the  one historical  episode  in which  the  growth  of prices  differed 
markedly  from that  of wages.  When  this catch-up  dummy  is included,  the 
price-wage  feedback  coefficient  drops  to 0.11, below  Perry's  value  of 0.21. 
In addition  to the usual types of uncertainties,  then, there  is the specific 
possibility  that the price-wage  feedback  coefficient  could be well below 
0.32, a possibility  I will deal  with  below. 
This expression  is then combined  with a price  markup  equation  along 
the lines of equation  2. The model  is not as elaborate  as that  estimated  by 
Gordon  because  I omitted  his indirect  tax, capital  cost, and  cyclical  terms. 
(I tried  the last, but found  them  to have the wrong  sign.) To simplify  this 
analysis,  the price  equation  is fit  with  average  hourly  earnings  as the inde- 
pendent  variable  and  the consumer  price  index as the dependent  variable. 
It would  have been more  appropriate  to use labor  compensation  (includ- 
ing fringe  benefits) as the independent  variable  and the nonfarm  deflator 
as the dependent  variable,  but the errors  introduced  by my simplification 
seem  modest  and  can be adjusted  for. The variable  used  for the materials 
price  change  is the component  of the producer  price  index called "crude 
materials  for further  processing"-a weighted  average  of the price  index 
for foodstuffs  and  feedstuffs  (with an official  weight  as of December  1978 
of 0.59),  fuel  (weight =  0.15),  and other nonfood materials (weight = 
0.26). When  equation  2 was fitted  in unconstrained  form  with the lagged 
dependent  variable  to allow for a delayed  response,  the sum of the long- 
run coefficients  a, and a6 exceeded  unity, an inadmissible  result.  So the 
equation  was  reestimated  with  the  long-run  coefficients  constrained  to sum 
to unity  by subtracting  p-1  from  the other  variables;  it also includes  dum- 
mies for controls,  D71.72, and post controls, D7475, periods. These had 
highly  significant  impacts  and  this  time  did  not distort  the  other  coefficients 
in the  equation.  The equation  is 
(2')  p  -p-i  =  -1.207  +  0.6632  (w  -p-)  +  0.0953  (p  -p-1) 
(-3.8)  (5.5)  (4.0) 
-1.210  D71,72  +  2.753 D74,75, 
(-2.1)  (4.5) 
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The  productivity  trend  is 1.21 percent  per  year;  the fit is reasonably  good; 
and  the  price  index  for crude  materials  is highly  significant.  Solving  for the 
long-run  coefficients  of w and  p, yields  values  of 0.874 and 0.126, respec- 
tively. 
The  implications  of this  two-equation  model  can  best  be summarized  by 
solving  the equations  together  and finding  the implied  long-run  inflation- 
unemployment  relationship.  After a slight adjustment  in the constant  to 
account  for the fact that the consumer  prices  rise on average  0.2 percent 
a year more rapidly  than the nonfarm  deflator  and that gross compensa- 
tion rises on average  0.4 percent per year more rapidly than average 
hourly  earnings,  the  long-run  equations  are 
(3a')  p  -10.77  +  48.46 U-1 +  0.4655 p', 
when  relative  crude  prices  are  exogenous,  and 
(3b')  p =  -7.28  +  33.06 U-1 +  0.3177 p6, 
when  absolute  crude  prices  are  exogenous, 
where  p' and  pc  are  now to be interpreted  as trend  rates  of change  in rela- 
tive or absolute  prices  of crude  materials.'3 
The stable-price  unemployment  rate, U*, is found  to equal  4.5 percent 
in both equations;  this is slightly  more  than the average  value of 4.1 per- 
cent  over  the 1954-77 period  and  corresponds  to a noninflationary  official 
unemployment  rate of 6.2 percent  in 1978, which  is approximately  what 
other  investigators  such  as  Hall, Modigliani  and  Papademos,  Wachter,  and 
Cagan  have found.'4  At this unemployment  rate, a one percentage  point 
13. The constant adjustment  is derived as follows. The equation that should be 
fit  is  p,n  =  ao +  a1W, +  a2p0, where p,n  is the rate of  change of  the nonfarm de- 
flator, and w. is that of gross compensation. During the period, w_ =  w +  0.4 and 
p =  p,n +  0.2. Substituting  yields p -  0.2 +  a0 +  alw  +  0.4al  +  a2p,.  Therefore 
0.2 +  0.4a,  =  0.2 +  (0.4) (0.87)  =  0.55 is added to the constant in the consumer 
price, average hourly earnings equation. This value should be subtracted from the 
constant of equation 2' to find the unemployment  rate at which an equation of pn on 
W. would show stable prices, and at which equation 2' would show prices rising at 
0.55 percent  a year. 
14. See Hall, "The Process of Inflation";  Modigliani and Papademos, "Optimal 
Demand Policies"; Michael L. Wachter, "The Changing Cyclical Responsiveness  of 
Wage Inflation,"  BPEA, 1:1976, pp. 115-59; and Phillip Cagan, "The Reduction of 
Inflation  and the Magnitude  of Unemployment,"  in William Feliner, ed., Contempo- 
rary Economic Problems (American Enterprise  Institute, 1977), pp. 15-52. Edward  M. Gramlich  137 
rise in unemployment  would lower the inflation  rate by 0.2 percentage 
point in the first  year, a flat short-run  trade-off  relationship  with a slope 
somewhat  below what other investigators  have found, but certainly  not 
outside  the range  of estimates  of values  of this  parameter.15 
THE  SOCIAL  COSTS  OF  INFLATION  AND  UNEMPLOYMENT 
The various social costs of inflation and unemployment  have beert 
enumerated  many  times.16  Inflation  generates  information  costs,  efficiency 
costs, and distributional  losses that are especially  serious for the aged; 
unemployment  implies  an output  and income  gap that may disadvantage 
all income  groups  but  is particularly  harmful  to those  with  lower  incomes. 
But to analyze  policy choices  in the presence  of price shocks,  it is neces- 
sary  to know  more  than  that  both  unemployment  and  inflation  entail  social 
costs-in  particular,  how great are these relative costs in quantitative 
terms? 
The literature  on program  evaluation  suggests  many ways to answer 
such a question.  A first  method  might  be called the revealed  preference 
technique.  As applied  to this problem,  the reasoning  would  be as follows. 
If there is a nonvanishing  long-run  trade-off  relationship,  policymakers 
have already  had to select a point on the trade-off  curve,  and the slope of 
the  curve  at that  point  can  be examined  to find  the  implicit  marginal  rate  of 
substitution  of policymakers.  The trade-off  in the above model is just 
barely  nonvanishing,  perhaps  by enough  to make  such a comparison  pos- 
sible. While the weighted unemployment  rate (and implicit point of 
tangency) has varied,  it has averaged  4.1 percent  over the 1954-77 pe- 
riod,  just  slightly  below  the implied  noninflationary  rate  of 4.5 percent.  At 
U = 4.1,  the implied marginal  rates of  substitution  in  the long-run 
trade-off  relationship  are given by 48.5 x  4.  1-2 =  2.9 when changes  in 
relative  crude materials  prices are exogenous, and 33.1 x  4.  1-2  =  2.0 
when  changes  in absolute  crude  prices  are  exogenous.  Both tangency  solu- 
tions are shown  in fiaure  1. Hence this revealed  preference  method  sug- 
15. See Arthur M. Okun, "Efficient Disinflationary Policies," American Eco- 
nomic Review, vol. 68 (May 1978, Papers and Proceedings, 1977), pp. 348-52. 
16. Most recently by Gardner Ackley, "The Costs of  Inflation," and Martin 
Feldstein, "The Private and Social Costs of Unemployment,"  in American Economic 
Review, vol. 68 (May 1978, Papers and Proceedings,  1977), pp. 149-54, and 155-58, 
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Figure  1. The Long-Run  Phillips Curve  and Optimal  Inflation-Unemployment 
Combination 
Inflation  rate,  p 
12 -  Relative pc exogenous 
9 
Absolute Pc exogenous 
6 
3 
Tangenecy  point: 
b = 2  ~  ~  b=  . 
0  Unemploym  ent rate, U 
2  4  4.5 
Source: Derived by solving text equations 1' and 2' for the implied long-run inflation-unemployment 
relationship and adjusting for the greater average increase in consumer prices relative to  the nonfarm 
deflator and gross compensation relative to average hourly earnings, as described in text note 13. 
The pc term is the trend percentage  rate of change in the absolute price of crude materials; pc is the trend 
rate of change in the relative price of crude materials, or pc  -  p;  b is marginal rate of  substitution be- 
tween unemployment and inflation or, alternatively, the relative social cost of unemployment. 
The tangency points determine the optimal long-run trade-off. The figure assumes that policymakers 
have chosen a trade-off  at which the weighted unemployment  rate is 4.1 percent, its average over the 1954-77 
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gests that an added percentage  point of unemployment  is between two 
and  three  times  as costly  as an added  percentage  point  of inflation."7 
A second approach  to estimating  the relative  costs of unemployment 
and inflation  might  be called the direct  estimation  technique.  As applied 
by Modigliani  and Papademos,'8  it involves comparing  the costs of the 
output  loss of an added  percentage  point of unemployment,  3 percent  of 
GNP according  to Okun's  law, with the costs of an added  point of infla- 
tion. To compute  the last, they deal with only the asset transfer  costs of 
inflation,  those  representing  transfers  from  creditors  when actual  inflation 
rates  exceed  those anticipated  at the time  financial  contracts  were signed. 
Modigliani  and Papademos  ignore  the corresponding  gains  to debtors  by 
virtue  of what might  be known as the robbery  theorem-robbeiy is not 
costless even though  it is "only a transfer";  indeed  it is at least as costly 
as the size of the transfer.  Because  the total  value  of fixed  money  claims  in 
the economy  is about 1.5 times GNP, a one percentage  point rise in the 
inflation  rate lowers  the real value of these claims  by approximately  1.5 
percent  of GNP. This yields an estimate  for b, the relative  social cost of 
unemployment,  of 2 (3/1.5),  similar  to that of the revealed  preference 
value. 
The next methods  focus more directly  on voter preferences.  One ap- 
proach  is to use the University  of Michigan's  index  of consumer  sentiment 
to measure  the relative  unpopularity  of inflation  and  unemployment.  Con- 
sumption  studies  by Suits and Sparks,  Hymans,  and Juster  and Wachtel 
have  established  that  movements  in the index  can  help explain  movements 
in consumption,  assuming  that consumers  feel better  off and  hence spend 
more when the index is high.19  A further  analysis  by Lovell then shows 
that movements  in the index can, in turn, be explained  by stock prices, 
inflation,  and unemployment.  The index is lowered by 0.88 point with 
an additional  percentage  point  of unemployment,  and  by 1.23 points  with 
17. Although the social discount rate on inflation should enter into the calcula- 
tion of  the optimum [b =  a1a5(1 + rp)  U-2/(1  + rp  -  a2 -  a3)],  its  quantitative 
impact is small for small values of rp.  Hence I assumed it to be zero in this calcula- 
tion and in the figure. 
18. Modigliani and Papademos, "Optimal  Demand Policies." 
19. See Daniel B. Suits and Gordon R. Sparks, "Consumption  Regressions with 
Quarterly  Data," in James S. Duesenberry  and others, eds., The Brookings  Quarterly 
Econometric Model of the United States (Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 203-23; Saul 
H. Hymans, "Consumer Durable Spending: Explanation and Prediction," BPEA, 
2:1970, pp. 173-99; F. Thomas Juster and Paul Wachtel, "Inflation  and the Con- 
sumer,"  BPEA, 1:1972, pp. 71-114. 140  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
an added  percentage  point of inflation.20  Hence the implied  value of b is 
0.72 (0.88/1.23).  Unlike all other  techniques,  this indirect  survey  mea- 
sure  weights  unemployment  less than inflation,  and thus even less than  it 
is weighted  in the commonly  used economic discomfort  index (which 
sums  inflation  and  unemployment  rates,  thus  assuming  b is 1). 
A nrtore  direct  alternative  is to use answers  to the Gallup  poll question, 
"What  do you think  is the most important  problem  facing  the country  to- 
day?"  Households  were  asked  this  question  twenty-eight  times  since 1957, 
and time-series  changes  in the answering  pattern  are known  to be corre- 
lated with actual  levels of inflation  and unemployment.  The basic idea is 
to explain  the percent  of households  responding  that the most important 
problem  was inflation  or unemployment  with various  mathematical  con- 
structions  of actual  inflation  or unemployment  indicators  as independent 
variables. 
In principle  there  are  two ways  in which  the equations  could  be fit. One 
way is in unconstrained  form, using as the dependent  variable  the simple 
percentage  of families  responding  inflation  or unemployment: 
Pr(p) = f(pe,  p  -  pe,  U  -  U*,  UU*), 
Pr(U)  = f(pe,  p  -  pe,  U  -  U*,  UU*), 
where  Pr(p) and Pr(U) measure  respectively  the percent  of families  re- 
sponding  inflation  or unemployment;  pe,  some version of the expected 
rate of inflation;  p  pe,  the unanticipated  rate;  U -  U*, cyclical  unem- 
ployment;  and UU*, the official global unemployment  rate when the 
constant-weight  unemployment  is at its noninflationary  value.21  This rate 
in unconstrained  form allows implied costs of inflation  and unemploy- 
ment  to depend  differently  on anticipated  and  unanticipated  inflation  and 
cyclical and noncyclical unemployment.  Quadratic  terms can also be 
used  as needed  to test  for any  nonlinearities  in the social  cost function. 
The problem  with  the unconstrained  technique  is that  it does not force 
respondents  to trade  off inflation  and  unemployment.  Inflation  and  unem- 
ployment  are common  answers  to the question,  averaging  28 percent  and 
20.  Michael C.  Lovell,  "Why Was the  Consumer Feeling  So  Sad?" BPEA, 
2:1975, pp. 473-79. 
21.  Because the constant-weight  value of the noninflationary  rate is a constant, 
converting  it to an overall basis as shown is the only way I know to allow respondents 
to express  their satisfaction or dissatisfaction  with the level of unemployment  at full 
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10 percent,  respectively,  of the responses  during  the period.  But they are 
not the only answers,  and to the extent  that households  change  their  re- 
sponse  to inflation  from,  say, crime  in the streets,  the interpretation  would 
be different  than  if inflation  gained  at the expense  of unemployment.  The 
way to overcome  this difficulty  is to fit regressions  with the dependent 
variable  defined  as Pr (p) /[Pr (p)  + Pr ( U) ]. 
Table 1 provides some illustrative  equations,  fit first in an uncon- 
strained  form, to explain the total percentage  of households  responding 
inflation  or unemployment.  Equations  1-1 through  1-4 explain  the percent 
responding  inflation;  1-5 through  1-8, the percent  responding  unemploy- 
ment. In table 1 the expected  rate of inflation,  pe,  is computed  as the 
average  annual  rate  over  the eight  quarters  before  the question  was asked, 
and  it can be seen that  expected  inflation  always  has a much  larger  coeffi- 
cient than unexpected  inflation  (p -  pe).  This could reflect  a number  of 
factors-that  the households  are not yet informed  of economists'  beliefs 
that they should already  have protected  themselves  against anticipated 
inflation;  that  it may  be difficult  to protect  oneself (for example,  many  may 
still be looking  for an easy way to save at a positive  after-tax  real interest 
rate); that  people  do not fear  something  until  they expect  it; or that  I may 
not have created  a good proxy  for expected  inflation.  Whatever  the expla- 
nation, this particular  way of disaggregating  the inflation  term does not 
give  very  sensible  results.  Hence  in all equations  except  1-1 and 1-5, I have 
simply  used the contemporaneous  inflation  rate as the independent  vari- 
able. 
Regarding  other aspects of the implied loss function,  the unemploy- 
ment  rate at high employment,  UU*, has a large  coefficient  in the unem- 
ployment  equations  (equations  1-5 and 1-6), which  indicates  that trend 
unemployment  is by no means viewed as costless by respondents.  The 
variable  has so little variance  that its t-statistic  is usually  low, however. 
When quadratic  terms  were tried in equations  1-3 and 1-4 for inflation 
and 1-7 and 1-8 for unemployment,  p2  and (U -  U* )  2 invariably  took on 
the wrong  sign,  indicating  that the loss function  implicit  in these answers 
does not imply increasing  marginal  cost as the rate of either  inflation  or 
unemployment  rises. 
The most reliable  equations  appear  to be 1-2 and 1-6. They can be 
interpreted  as follows. Holding unemployment  constant,  an added per- 
centage  point  of inflation  raises  the number  of respondents  who think  that 
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(equation 1-2). Holding inflation  constant,  an added percentage  point 
of cyclical  unemployment  (U  -  U*) raises the number  of respondents 
who think that unemployment  is the nation's  most serious problem  by 
5.30 percentage  points (equation 1-6). If social costs increase  in some 
proportion  to the  number  of people  whose  views  about  the most  important 
problem  are  changed,  the implied  estimate  of the social cost of unemploy- 
ment  relative  to that  of inflation  is 1.28 (5.30/4.14).  This time  the value 
of b is somewhat  greater  than unity,  but not as high as that given by the 
revealed  preference  technique. 
Table  2 shows  the  results  when  percentages  of respondents  stating  infla- 
tion and employment  are  constrained  to add  to 100. Since  they do add to 
100, only one type of equation  needs to be fit. I fit the one with infla- 
tion responses  in the numerator,  and the implied  coefficients  for unem- 
ployment  are the negatives  of those in the table.  Equation  2-1 of table 2 
confirms  the above  result  that  expected  inflation  has a much  more  adverse 
impact  than unexpected  inflation,  and in fact this time the latter  has the 
wrong sign. The trend  unemployment  rate, UU*, continues  to have the 
proper  sign and a large  impact,  but is statistically  insignificant.  Equation 
2-2 uses a different  variant  of the expected  inflation  rate as the indepen- 
dent variable,  simply  the nominal  interest  rate on long-term  bonds (as- 
sumed  to equal r +  pe,  where  r is the real interest  rate). The results  are 
essentially  the same,  and  unanticipated  inflation,  while  now displaying  the 
proper  sign,  has a much  smaller  estimated  impact  than expected  inflation 
(because the coefficient  for p is below that for r + pe). Equation 2-3 
adopts  the successful  forms of table 1, and shows that trend  unemploy- 
ment  has effectively  been eliminated.  Equation  2-4, which  uses quadratic 
terms,  shows again  that  both are of the wrong  sign. The implied  estimate 
of b in equation  2-3 jumps  to 3.96 (11.73/2.96)-now  a point of unem- 
ployment  is viewed  as nearly  four times  as harmful  as a point  of inflation. 
There are, of course, serious  flaws in all these approaches  for mea- 
suring  b. The revealed  preference  notion  depends  on my own estimates  of 
the slope of the long-run  inflation-unemployment  trade-off;  it is based  on 
particular  historical  events  such as the Vietnam  War,  and  relies  on a very 
strong  assumption  of how underlying  preferences  are reflected  in actual 
policy decisions.  The direct  estimation  approach  quantifies  only one type 
of cost of inflation,  and  very  crudely  at that.  The index  of consumer  senti- 
ment  method  is indirect,  and  it is essentially  designed  to determine  whether 
households  will consume  heavily,  not to assess  perceptions  of social  prob- 42  Eco^ 
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lems. The problem  with the Gallup  poll methods  is that people are not 
being  asked  to act on their  preferences,  only to state  them-a  well-known 
and fundamental  problem  with using survey data. Further,  the respon- 
dents,  like economists,  may not understand  the nature  and seriousness  of 
the inflation  problem  very  well;  they may overstate  the seriousness  if they 
believe  that  prices  go up because  of inflation  and  that  money  incomes  rise 
as a result of their hard work. Or they may understate  the seriousness 
because  they do not understand  the subtleties  of efficient  resource  alloca- 
tion. Moreover,  expectations  are relevant.  If people, based on historical 
experience,  hold regressive  expectations  about  unemployment  and  extrap- 
olative expectations  about  inflation,  a rise in the inflation  rate will capi- 
talize  future  fears  much  more  than  will a rise in unemployment,  overstat- 
ing  the relative  costs  of current  inflation  and  thus  understating  b. This  may 
also  be the reason  why  expected  inflation  is considered  so painful.  Finally, 
the survey  approach  does  not address  the key distributional  issue: if either 
inflation  or cyclical unemployment  were to be particularly  painful to a 
certain  subgroup  of the population,  as both certainly  are, changes  in eco- 
nomic conditions  may add little to the number  of answers  in the popula- 
tion at large  but a lot to some conception  of overall  social costs or aggre- 
gate pain. About the only point the survey  approach  has in its favor is 
that for once social planners  are asking people their preferences,  not 
telling  them. 
Returning  now to the question of whether or not to accommodate 
shocks,  if the results  of this section  can be believed  at all, two important 
implications  are  that  the loss function  appears  to be approximately  linear, 
with no discernible  change in the marginal  rate of  substitution  over 
observed  ranges of variation  of inflation  and unemployment,  and that 
anticipated  inflation  appears  to be at least as unpleasant  to people as 
unanticipated  inflation.  The first  conclusion  tends to support  the superi- 
ority of  shock-accommodating  policies, although, as was mentioned 
above,  other  conditions  must  also be satisfied.  The second  conclusion  dic- 
tates against  an excessive discount  of future  inflation  because it can be 
anticipated,  and  tends  to lower  rp  and  raise  the future  costs  of any  inflation 
that  follows  an initial  shock. 
The more detailed evaluations  of various policy responses  to price 
shocks  then  require  quantitative  estimates  of b. These are  distributed  over 
a fairly  wide  range,  but it should  be somewhat  reassuring  that  quite  diver- 
gent analytical  techniques  for measuring  them, each one imperfect  in its 146  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
own way, gave estimates  that were at least halfway consistent.  Ranked 
from  low to high, and compared  with the economic  discomfort  index,  the 
estimates  are  as  follows. 
Method  Value of b 
Index of consumer  sentiment  (Lovell)  0.7 
Economic discomfort  index  1.0 
Unconstrained  Gallup  poll (table 1, equations  1-2 and 1-6)  1.3 
Direct estimation  (Modigliani  and  Papademos)  2.0 
Revealed  preference (absolute  Pc exogenous)  2.0 
Revealed  preference (relative  Pc exogenous)  2.9 
Constrained  Gallup  poll (table  2, equation  2-3)  4.0 
An added  percentage  point of unemployment  appears  to be from nearly 
one to four times as painful as an added percentage  point of inflation, 
with  both  a median  and  mean  estimate  of about  two. 
SERIAL  CORRELATION  OF  PRICE  SHOCKS 
One relatively  minor issue that also comes up in the analysis  of re- 
sponses  to shocks  is the question  of serial  correlation.  When  a price  shock 
occurs,  is it more  likely  to reverse  itself (as might  be the case in Gordon's 
farm  sector) or repeat  itself (as with growing  scarcities  of needed  mate- 
rials)? The issue of serial correlation  does not change the underlying 
analytics  in any obvious respect because follow-on shocks can be re- 
sponded  to in the same  way as can initial shocks (as long as they remain 
exogenous),  but still  it is interesting  to estimate  the degree  of serial  corre- 
lation  to compute  realistic  estimates  of the amount  of inflation  and  unem- 
ployment  implied  by standard  responses  to initial  shocks. 
Beginning  with the stochastic  part of equations 1' and 2', not much 
evidence  seems  to exist of either  positive  or negative  serial  correlation  in 
the equation residuals  themselves.  Both equations satisfy the Durbin- 
Watson  test for the absence  of serial  correlation  at the 95 percent  confi- 
dence  level. 
But the residuals  are not the only source  of shocks  in the model. The 
other source is the price term for crude materials  in equation  2'. The 
equations  in table 3 investigate  whether  this rate of change is serially 
correlated  by fitting  a series of autoregressive  equations.  Equations  3-1 
and 3-2 explain the gross rate of change of crude materials  prices, p0, 00 
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with  autoregressive  lags  up to three  years;  3-3 and  3-4 explain  the relative 
rate  of change  of crude  materials  prices (p', where  p' =  P-  p).  Com- 
parison  of the two pairs  of equations  indicates  whether  or not any endog- 
enous  serial  correlation  component  operates  through  the general  rate of 
inflation. 
All equations  display  reasonably  good evidence  of some serial  correla- 
tion. Farm  price movements  seem to follow a two-year  cycle (based on 
work  Saul  Hymans  showed  me from  the University  of Michigan's  econo- 
metric  model), apparently  leading  to the negative  coefficients  for the two- 
year  lag terms.  The one- and three-year  lag terms  indicate  positive  serial 
correlation,  suggesting  that price shocks generally  are not reversed  but 
are augmented  by future  shocks.  Approximately  half of this autoregres- 
sion  is eliminated  when  relative  changes  in crude  prices  are  used.  Whether 
in absolute  or relative  terms  then,  price  shocks  will be more  of a source  of 
continuing  inflation,  as opposed  to one-time  increases  in price  levels,  than 
would  at  first  be apparent. 
ACCOMMODATING  AND  NONACCOMMODATING  POLICIES 
To complete  the model it is necessary  to add some equations  to in- 
corporate  the government's  policy response.  At one extreme,  if the re- 
sponse  were to be complete  accommodation  of price shocks, such equa- 
tions  would  be unnecessary:  then the unemployment  rate would be held 
at some predetermined  level regardless  of any shocks, and the resulting 
inflation  would be given by the wage-price  feedback  model described  in 
equations  1 and 2 above. Calculations  would be just as unnecessary  for 
the other extreme  policy of extinguishing  price-shock  inflation  immedi- 
ately: there the unemployment  rate would simply  be allowed to rise by 
the amount  appropriate  to hold inflation  constant.  But regardless  of the 
desirability  of these strategies,  they may not be feasible. By the time a 
shock  is felt, it may be too late to prevent  the unemployment  rate from 
rising  in a strict  accommodation  policy, and  it will almost  certainly  be too 
late to magnify  the rise in unemployment  under an extreme  policy to 
extinguish  inflation.  The only realistic approach  might be to use some 
variant  of a strategy  of nominal  income growth,  and then more detail in 
the  model  is necessary  to determine  the  path  to be taken  by unemployment 
and  inflation  rates. 
The most obvious nominal income strategy  is the constant growth Edward  M. Gramlich  149 
rule-macro policy operates  to keep nominal  GNP growing  at some pre- 
determined  rate.22  Expressed  in percentage  changes, 
(6)  p+y  =  Z, 
where  y is the percentage  rate of growth  of real output  and z is the pre- 
determined  target  growth  for nominal  income. For this paper I do not 
want  to get into the question  of whether  the authorities  must  take activist 
policy measures  to keep nominal  income growth  at rate z. I assume  that 
macro  authorities  can follow such a policy, whether  or not the growth  of 
money  income  is constant  automatically. 
The other equation  relates  cyclical  changes  in the unemployment  rate 
to cyclical  changes  in real  output  by Okun's  3:1 relationship, 
(7)  y  -l-I0.  03 (U  -U*), 
where Y is the level of real output and Y* is that at high employment 
(U*),  assumed  to grow at a constant  trend  rate. Because  the growth  of 
nominal  income  will not be altered  in response  to a price  shock,  the shock 
will first  raise  p and lower y in equal amounts,  resulting  in a temporary 
rise in unemployment  by equation  7. This unemployment  will gradually 
curb  the inflation,  actually  leading  in the intermediate  run to some over- 
shooting and a reduction  in the inflation  rate relative  to the level prior 
to the shock. The lower inflation  then will lead to higher  GNP growth, 
lower unemployment,  and so forth. The process  will oscillate to a point 
at which unemployment  returns  to its natural  rate, GNP grows at its 
long-run  rate,  and  the inflationary  impact  of the shock  dies out. 
The main  problem  with the constant  growth  strategy  is that the cycles 
in unemployment  may be excessively  long. Because  prices and wages re- 
spond sluggishly  to utilization  changes  in this model, cyclical  unemploy- 
ment  persists  until  the inflation  rate  declines  sufficiently  to restore  the real 
growth  rate,  which  may  take some  years.  Particularly  when an accommo- 
dative policy is optimal,  it should be feasible for policy to improve  the 
constant  growth  outcome. The way to do this would be to introduce  a 
lagged  feedback  rule,  under  which  the growth  of nominal  income  is set by 
(8)  p  + y  =z  - )  -). 
22. As stated in Gordon, "Alternative Responses of Policy to External Supply 
Shocks." 150  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
When there is underutilization  in the previous  period, [(Y/Y*)  -  1] 1 
is less than zero, and the growth  of nominal  income is raised by some 
fraction  X. In this way, persistent  cycles in unemployment  can be com- 
bated, though  at the cost of a slower  rate of decline of the inflation  rate 
from  the initial  post-shock  level. 
Assessment  of Alternative  Response  Strategies 
In this section I use the model described  above to estimate  the social 
costs  of various  policies  of response  to shocks.  Above  I showed  that,  under 
a set of simplifying  assumptions,  accommodative  policies will in general 
be preferred:  here the approach  is to tally up the social costs to measure 
the margin  of superiority,  and  to observe  how this margin  changes  if some 
of the simplifying  assumptions  are  relaxed. 
The basic approach  is to simulate  the model in the presence of an 
assumed  price shock. Because  it is easier  to understand  the results  if the 
system  is in an optimum  position  before  the shock, I try to place it there. 
Using  the revealed  preference  assumption  and  my model  precisely  as esti- 
mated,  this  preshock  equilibrium  would  be a weighted  unemployment  rate 
of 4.1 percent (5.8 percent  official  rate for 1978). If the trade-off  were 
really  vanishing,  even though  my estimates  do not quite  suggest  that, the 
preshock  optimum  would  be the nonaccelerating-inflation  unemployment 
rate-the  NAIRU-of  4.5 percent.  There  is obviously  not a large  differ- 
ence between  the two, but for the sake of argument  I followed  the natural 
rate  rule  and  chose the preshock  equilibrium  of 4.5 percent.  At that  point 
the  implied  value  of b in my  estimated  model  is 2.4 (when  relative  changes 
in crude  materials  prices  are  exogenous). 
The results  are  based  on comparisons  of the model  simulated  with 1978 
historical  values, a control  simulation  in which  the prices  of crude  mate- 
rials are assumed  to be stable, and a set of experimental  simulations  in 
which  the prices  of crude  materials  are assumed  to rise by 10 percent  in 
year 1, with follow-on shocks as dictated  by the serial correlation  as- 
sumption.  Macro  policy is assumed  to respond  according  to each of four 
strategies:  complete  accommodation,  with U remaining  at its "optimum" 
value of 4.5 percent throughout;  the lagged feedback nominal income 
growth policy (equation 8);  the strategy  of constant nominal income 
growth (equation 6);  and complete  extinguishing  of the shock-induced 
inflation  over  a three-year  period. Edward  M. Gramlich  151 
In each case I compute  the difference  between  experimental  and con- 
trol simulation  values  for the rate  of inflation  and  unemployment  and the 
discounted  sum over an infinite  horizon.  Three discount  rates are tried: 
zero, as if society's  stake in either  preserving  the value of the dollar or 
avoiding unemployment  were as strong tomorrow as it is today; the 
"golden  rule"  rate  of 3 percent;  and 6 percent,  arbitrarily  higher  than  the 
golden  rule rate  to approximate  what might  be the real marginal  product 
of capital. One could also argue (just for inflation) that if any shock- 
created  inflation  is capitalized  in future  contracts,  it entails  lower social 
costs in the future  or, effectively,  a higher  discount  rate. 
The first  set of results  is given  in table 4. Here no serial  correlation  of 
the price  increase  of materials  is assumed  and  the coefficients  of the model 
are taken as estimated  in equations 1' and 2'. Columns 1 and 2 show 
the results  when the inflationary  shock  is completely  accommodated:  the 
initial  impetus  declines  sharply  at first,  but after  year 4 decays  at a much 
slower rate (a5a3  +  a2 from equation 3b).  The cumulated sum of inflation 
impacts  in this case  is 3.29 for the one-time  increase  in materials  prices  of 
10 percent.  In columns 3 and 4 at least some rise in unemployment  is 
allowed,  and the inflationary  impact  is less. The closest to the accommo- 
dation strategy  is the lagged feedback  strategy  (with X =  1):  here the 
nominal  growth  in income  is adjusted  to eliminate  utilization  gaps  in pre- 
vious years, and some reduction  occurs  in cumulated  inflation  and some 
increase  in cumulated  unemployment.  The strict  constant  growth  rule is 
shown  in columns  5 and  6, featuring  a relatively  abrupt  decline  of inflation 
but  unemployment  that  persists  well past  the first  five  years.  The complete 
extinguishing  or "cold  turkey"  strategy  shown  in columns  7 and 8 is even 
more extreme: simply letting unemployment  rise the requisite  amount 
to eliminate  the inflation  over a three-year  period.  The cumulative  unem- 
ployment  in that strategy  is less than  that in the constant  nominal  income 
strategy  because  inflation  is not allowed  to be incorporated  into adaptive 
expectations.23 
The social costs implied  by various  strategies  appear  at the bottom  of 
the table.  If b =  2.4, as would  be implied  by my price-wage  equations  if 
the starting  point  were  an optimum,  it can  be seen  that  the accommodative 
strategy  is indeed superior.  The social costs that accompany  the shock 
are only slightly  higher  in the lagged  feedback  policy, but they approxi- 
mately  double  in the strategies  in columns  7 and 8. 
23. This is the same principle that is illustrated  in Gramlich, "Timing  of Unem- 
ployment  in a Recession." 9 .0  :Z) 
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The bottom  two lines of the table then conduct  sensitivity  tests on b, 
using  values of 1.4 and 3.4, respectively.  The low value of b obviously 
implies  that  before  the shock  the economy  should  have been operating  at 
a higher  unemployment  rate to be optimal (assuming  my model is cor- 
rect), and  at a lower  rate  for the higher  value  of b. In the former  case, the 
accommodative  policy is no longer optimal,  though  it is still to be pre- 
ferred  over the nonaccommodation  strategies.  In the latter case, with a 
high b, the margin  of superiority  of the accommodation  strategy  is much 
greater.  Among the lesser conclusions,  the lagged  feedback  rule appears 
to be a reasonable  real  world  proxy  for a perhaps  infeasible  strict  accom- 
modation  strategy,  and the cold turkey  strategy  always  outperforms  that 
of constant  nominal  growth.  If unemployment  is to rise, it is best to take 
the  increase  quickly. 
The next set of simulations  in table 5 is aimed at introducing  some 
technical issues into these calculations.  Columns 1 through 4  assume 
some  serial  correlation  of shocks,  with  a one-period  autoregressive  scheme 
and  a coefficient  of 0.5 (similar  to equation  3-2 in table  3). For simplicity, 
only the extreme  accommodation  and extinguishing  policies are shown. 
When the shock is accommodated,  it can be seen that shock-induced 
inflation  persists  much  longer,  adding  to a cumulated  sum  nearly  twice as 
large as that in table 4. But because of the nonlinearity  in the Phillips 
curve,  unemployment  must  rise more than twice as much as it did in the 
simulations  of table  4 to extinguish  the shock. 
Columns  5 through  8 in table 5 move in the other  direction.  For these 
the serial  correlation  is removed  and the price-wage  feedback  coefficient 
(from  equation  1') is lowered  to 0.1 1-its  value  when  price  control  dum- 
mies are used in the wage change equation-with  the difference  (0.32 
-  0.1 1  ) added  to the wage-wage  feedback  coefficient.  In this case the in- 
flationary  impact  of the shock  vanishes  much  more  quickly,  and  the cumu- 
lative  sum  of inflation  is cut  by about  15 percent;  and,  again  because  of the 
nonlinearity  of the Phillips  curve,  the cumulative  sum of unemployment 
necessary  to extinguish  the shock is cut almost in half. In this case the 
strategy  of immediately  extinguishing  the shock narrowly  surpasses  ac- 
commodation when b =  1.4. 
These simulations  then generally  confirm  the superiority  of accommo- 
dation  strategies.  When  the system  is assumed  to be near  a social  optimum 
before the shock, and under the assumption  that my model is correct, 
accommodation  strategies  generally  entail about half the social cost of C  C 
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nonaccommodation  strategies.  If these assumptions  are relaxed  and b is 
allowed  to take on higher  values,  this margin  of superiority  widens.  And 
even  when  b is allowed  to take on lower  values,  as if the economy  should 
have had a higher unemployment  rate all along, the accommodation 
strategy still compares rather favorably with the nonaccommodation 
strategies. 
The Game-of-Strategy  View 
An important  potential  defect  in the foregoing  estimation  and simula- 
tion approach  for analyzing  responses  to price shocks is that it ignores 
feedback  from the economic  environment  to the coefficients  themselves. 
As a consequence,  the standard  simulation  approach  may  vastly  overstate 
the social costs of a nonaccommodating  policy because  it ignores  impor- 
tant information  about government  intentions.  One articulation  of this 
idea  is implicit  in Fellner's  game-of-strategy  view  of the inflation  process.24 
In this view any  past  inflation  data  are  generated  in an environment  char- 
acterized  by a set of measured  variables  (unemployment  rates  and  so on) 
and unmeasured  variables,  such as the perceived view of the private 
sector  on how serious  the government  is about  disinflation.  If the govern- 
ment were known to be lax in fighting  infla-tion,  private  wage and price 
setters  would not reduce  wage or price inflation  much when unemploy- 
ment hit-they  would wait out the period of unemployment  with what 
appear  statistically  as sluggish  wages and prices. If, on the other hand, 
they knew that the government  meant  business  about fighting  inflation, 
they would fear losses of jobs and sales from holding to their sluggish 
wages  and  prices,  and  they  would  reduce  inflation  more  quickly. 
The main  practical  relevance  of Fellner's  point  today  lies in the transi- 
tional unemployment  costs of curing  an entrenched  inflation:  will those 
costs be small (with Fellner's backbone) or large (as predicted  by a 
standard  model such as the one I have estimated)?  But the same point 
also has implications  for the response  to shocks: the government  cannot 
afford to be accommodative  because that would destroy its inflation- 
fighting  credibility.  If everyone knew that the government  would not 
accommodate  shocks, the private sector would not pass them through 
for the same reason it would not maintain  sluggish  price and wage re- 
24.  William Fellner, Towards  a Reconstruction  of Macroeconomics. 156  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1979 
sponses.  Moreover, accommodating  any shock opens up a brave new 
world  in which  the government  can rationalize  any inflation  by calling  it 
a shock. Finally, accommodation  of positive shocks, even if offset by 
aggregate  demand reductions  following negative price shocks, will be 
inflationary  on average  if more  adverse  shocks  occur  than  favorable  ones 
(for example,  it is normal  when Iran is producing  oil at full capacity,  a 
shock  when  that  production  is below). 
At the verbal level, I think, little disagreement  would arise with the 
proposition  that expectations  of  the likely government  macro policy 
response  to movements  in unemployment  and inflation  are potentially 
important  in influencing  the price and wage change curves.  This is pre- 
sumably  why some adherents  of the standard  model emphasize  wage 
standards,  guideposts,  and the like. But going  from this view to a knowl- 
edge of exactly  how standard  models of the inflationary  process  must  be 
modified  to deal with the phenomenon  is a far more difficult  step. 
In his 1977 article,  Fellner himself adjusts  the standard  model in a 
rather  arbitrary  way. His point of departure  is Cagan's  empirical  model 
of the inflation  process,  a close cousin of the standard  model with three 
exceptions.  Cagan  does not disaggregate  the process  into separate  equa- 
tions for wages and prices, assumes  that the model is accelerationist  in 
the long run, fits a parameter  representing  the speed of adjustment  of 
inflationary  expectations,  and describes  the short-run  trade-off  relation- 
ship as linear.25  Rather  than  measuring  the degree  of acceleration  and  the 
speed  of adjustment  of expectations,  as in the standard  model, the Cagan 
model constrains  the former and estimates only the latter. When the 
standard  model is nearly accelerationist,  as most are, the properties  of 
both models become similar,  though  as an empirical  matter  Cagan  does 
find a greater  slope of the short-run  Phillips curve than occurs in most 
standard  models.  To allow  for a credible  anti-inflationary  strategy,  Fellner 
adjusts  Cagan's  model  by arbitrarily  doubling  the speed of adjustment  of 
expectations,  cutting approximately  in half the cumulative  unemploy- 
ment cost necessary  to cure inflation.  If this procedure  were applied  to 
the unemployment  impacts  of nonaccommodative  policies in the simula- 
tions of table 4, those impacts might similarly  be cut in half, greatly 
reducing  the margin  of superiority  of the accommodating  strategies.  If, 
on the other  hand,  the policy were accommodative,  it would demonstrate 
25. Cagan, "The Reduction  of Inflation,"  and William Fellner, "Guide  to the Vol- 
ume,"  in  Fellner,  ed.,  Contemporary  Econiomic  Problems,  pp.  15-52  and  1-14, 
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customary  laxity and no adjustments  would be needed  in the calculated 
social  costs. 
To see whether  Fellner has a point in scaling down the costs of a 
nonaccommodative  policy, I first examine the econometric  evidence a 
little more carefully and then discuss an apparently  ignored political 
aspect of  the problem. Regarding  the econometric evidence, Fellner 
himself  shows great  disdain  about any econometric  evidence  taken  from 
periods of policy laxity. But laxity, credibility,  and backbone are not 
mutually  exclusive  concepts-the government,  after  all, has always  men- 
tioned the goal of price stability,  and the government's  actions are suffi- 
ciently  random  that some price and wage setters  must have believed  the 
government  would follow this goal, at least in some past periods. Any 
recession,  and particularly  those before inflation  accelerated  in the mid- 
sixties,  might  therefore  be taken as evidence  of a government  resolve to 
fight  inflation  (or an inability  to stop cyclical unemployment).  If this is 
so, the standard  model should  overpredict price  and wage increases  in all 
those recessions  in which government  inflation-fighting  resolve is per- 
ceived and underpredict  when it is not. Because the standard  inflation 
model  described  above  fits  the same  short-run  slope  to cyclical  movements 
in the weighted  unemployment  rate,  this test then involves  comparing  in- 
flation  residuals  in the early  resolve  period  with  the later accommodation 
period. 
These  residuals  in the  five  recession  years  in the 1954-77 sample  period 
are given in table 6. The actual unemployment  peak in the 1970-71 
period  was in 1971, but because  that year was complicated  by the price- 
wage freeze, I used 1970 instead. Column 1 shows the wage-inflation 
residuals  from equation 1'; column 2, the price-inflation  residuals  from 
equation  2'; column  3, the price  residuals  corrected  for deviations  in com- 
pensation  from average  hourly earnings  and in the CPI from the non- 
farm  deflator;  and column  4, the simultaneous  solution  for the corrected 
price-equation  residuals,  as if I had  calculated  a dynamic  simulation  of the 
model  beginning  in the  recession  year.26 
26. The corrections are necessary because the compensation index is stochasti- 
cally related to average  hourly earnings,  and consumer  prices are similarly related to 
the nonfarm  business  deflator.  I am interested  in the residual  for the nonfarm deflator 
as  a  function of  gross compensation. The  equation in note  13 gives pn,  =  ao + 
al(w2  +  r1)  +  a2pc,  where r1 is the residual of the equation relating rates of change 
of compensation to average hourly earnings. If p = pn,  +  r2,  with r2 as the residual 
relating inflation rates, p =  ao +  a,(w  +  rl)  +  a2Pc  +  r2. The correction then in- 
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Table  6. Residuals  from  the Standard  Inflation  Model in Recession  Years, 1954-75% 
Percentage  points 
Corrected  p 
Sinigle  Simultaneous 
w  p  equation  solution 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
1954  -0.6  -0.9  0.2  -0.2 
1958  -0.5  0.2  -0.3  -0.7 
1961  -0.  1  -0.3  -0.5  -0.6 
1970  -0.2  1.1  -0.3  -0.4 
1975  0.6  -1.0  -0.3  0.1 
Source: Text equations 1' and 2'. 
a.  The wage, w, and price, p, variables used in the equations are the percentage rate of change in ad- 
justed average hourly earnings and the consumer price index, respectively. The residuals in column I are 
from text equLation  1' and in column 2, from text equation 2'. Column 3 corrects the residuals in column 2 
for deviations in compensation from average hourly earnings and the CPI from the nonfarm deflator, as 
deseribed  in the text, note 26. Column 4 presents corrected residuals from a simnultaneous  solution for the 
price equation residuals, as though a dynamic simulation of  the model  was conducted beginning in the 
recession year. 
The wage-equation  residuals  in the first three recessions are indeed 
negative,  indicating  some  overprediction  of wage  growth  in these  inflation- 
resolve periods. These residuals are small relative to  the equation's 
standard  error, averaging  less than one-half a standard  deviation,  but 
sufficiently  great  that  they  double  the short-run  slope of the Phillips  curve 
(averaging  0.4 for 1.5 percentage  points  of unemployment).  The idea also 
works in the latter two "nonresolve"  recessions,  underpredicting  wage 
changes  by an average  of 0.2 percentage  point.  The illustration  is perhaps 
particularly  strong  in the 1975 recession,  when  the government  promised 
an expeditious  return  to full employment  throughout.  Hence  there  is some 
evidence  from these residuals  on wage changes  that resolve  matters. 
The signals  from the price equation  are less clear. Using the residuals 
from column  3, which are corrected  for random  blips in the relationship 
between  the CPI and the nonfarm  deflator  and between  gross compensa- 
tion and average  hourly earnings,  the price equation  is found to over- 
predict  in two of the three early  recessions,  and both the later ones. The 
average  overprediction  in the early  recessions  is 0.2, again  small  relative 
to the equation's  standard  error  and the residual  corrections,  but not very 
small relative  to the flat short-run  slope of the Phillips curve. When I 
put these corrected  residuals  together  with the wage residuals  by solving 
the model simultaneously,  the result  is an average  overprediction  in the 
early  recessions  of 0.5. Enormous  uncertainties  exist in all of this, but if 
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his procedure  of arbitrarily  doubling  the short-run  slope of the Phillips 
curve  turns  out to be a reasonable  way to correct  the estimates.  Adding 
these adjustments  to the simulations  of table 4 would indeed approxi- 
mately  cut in half all implied  figures  of cyclical  unemployment  cost on the 
right  side  of the  table. 
Turning  from  this econometric  test to a more  basic discussion,  the idea 
that  private  price  and  wage  setters  have some  idea of how the government 
will deal with inflation  and unemployment  is not new and has been dis- 
cussed  many  times  in both a favorable  and an unfavorable  light. Without 
repeating  all the points that have been made, I would like to highlight 
one other aspect  of the theory,  which to my knowledge  has not received 
extensive  discussion.  The general  point of view of any kind of credibility 
model of the inflation  process  is a divergence  of interests  of the public 
and private  sector. The private  sector has one objective (raising  wages 
or prices) and the government  has another (holding them down). This 
sets up the bargaining-perception  situation  that  Fellner  emphasizes:  if the 
private  sector feels the government  has a strong  hand, it can be bluffed 
into less inflationary  contracts  by the fear of anticipated  unemployment 
once the government  plays its cards.  But there are at least three distinct 
problems  with  the  view: 
Uncertainty-The view hinges on the assumption  that estimated  co- 
efficients  of short-run  Phillips  curves  will change,  a necessarily  speculative 
assertion.  If they do not, or do not change  much, the temporary  unem- 
ployment  cost may force officials  to abandon  the strategy  and return  to 
high  employment. 
Horizon-If  the temporary  unemployment  required  to root out in- 
flation lasts past the next election, elected officials  may not implement 
policies  that improve  the nation's  welfare (essentially  the problem  of the 
political  business  cycle). In effect,  the interest  rate relevant  for the offi- 
cials is far higher  than  the rates  used in tables  4 and 5. 
Interest  groups-Even  if the median  voter were convinced  that some 
temporary  unemployment  was necessary  to cure  inflation,  strong  pressure 
groups  may be able to defeat such a policy. As a case in point, George 
Meany's  apparent  response  to President  Carter's  new religion  about  fight- 
ing inflation  seems more likely to change the identity of the President 
than  the  bargaining  strategy  of the  unions. 
These criticisms  are not necessarily  devastating  to Fellner's  argument 
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price and wage setters  do not believe or accept  the government's  resolve 
in fighting  inflation,  and if their actions  lead to high unemployment?  If 
somehow  the government  can establish  a position  above the fray, it may 
not be forced to take responsibility  for the high unemployment-which 
followed logically from private actions and from the fact that nobody 
took the government  seriously.  But here the Keynesian  tradition  gets in 
the way. After three decades  of economists'  proclaiming  that unemploy- 
ment  is not inevitable  and can be cured  by government  macro  policies, 
it will now be difficult  for economists  to state that unemployment  is the 
fault of the private sector. More realistically,  the government  will be 
blamed for high unemployment,  just as it often takes credit for high 
employment. 
It then  becomes  difficult  to know  how seriously  to take  Fellner's  objec- 
tion to the standard  model, and  my objections  to his objection.  Today  it 
is true that the percent  of respondents  who answer  that inflation  is the 
nation's most important  problem  is rising daily-as  my regressions  in 
tables 1 and 2 predict-and this should  give elected  officials  new resolve 
in their  fight  against  inflation.  Perhaps  price  and  wage  setters  in the econ- 
omy will perceive  this and  respond  to expected  unemployment  with  more 
restraint  than  they appear  to display  in response  to actual  unemployment. 
But as soon as unemployment  rises, the same regressions  predict that 
voters  will then  begin  to fear  unemployment  also, and  that  is likely  to sap 
the resolve  of officials  and  leave us with  the same  old lax policies  and  the 
same  old flat short-run  trade-off  curve.  In this  sense,  the ultimate  obstacle 
to accepting  the empirical  relevance  of Fellner's  argument  may be the 
seemingly  innocuous  coefficient  of cyclical  unemployment  in the Gallup 
poll regressions.  Price-setting  and wage-setting  behavior  might  not be in- 
flationary  if sufficient  resolve  were shown.  But can that ever happen  in a 
democracy  where  people  fear  unemployment  too, begin  to worry  about  it 
once  it starts  rising,  and  may  even  blame  it on the government? 
Rational  Expectations 
Fellner's  inflation-fighting  credibility  plays  the  role  of a variable  omitted 
from  standard  econometric  models  whose  presence  would  alter  the results. 
A more  fundamental  restructuring  of the standard  model  has  been  under- 
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expectations  school.27  In this section I examine  how a rational  expecta- 
tions model treats  responses  to price shocks. 
I begin with three caveats. The first is that the rational  expectations 
model used here is a somewhat  generalized  version  used by Fischer,  of 
which the pure rational  expectations  model is a special case.28  Fischer's 
model assumes  that price and wage setters  make rational  expectations 
forecasts  when  they sign their  price-wage  contracts,  but that  once signed, 
these contracts  fix wages and prices  over some horizon.29  If the contract 
period is short relative to the inside information  lag of the monetary 
authority,  the pure rational  expectations  result  emerges and the optimal 
rule for monetary  policy is simply  to let the money  supply  grow at a con- 
stant  rate  even  if policy  is concerned  with  minimizing  the  variance  of cycli- 
cal unemployment.  But if the contract  period  is long relative  to the inside 
lag of the  monetary  authority,  the  model  becomes  more  Keynesian  and  the 
authority  should  respond  to shocks  in a way that reflects  its view of the 
social costs of unanticipated  inflation  and cyclical  unemployment. 
The second  caveat  addresses  the  types  of prices  incorporated  in rational 
expectations  models.  All such  models  explain  cyclical  unemployment  as a 
negative  function  of errors  in forecasting  prices: if prices  and wages are 
lower  than  anticipated,  firms  and  labor  temporarily  supply  less output  and 
unemployment  temporarily  rises  above  its natural  rate.  Implicit  in this  be- 
havior  is the fact that prices  are taken  to be the "internal"  ones received 
for sales of goods and services,  rather  than  prices  paid to exogenous  sup- 
pliers.  With  a supply  shock  operating  in the Gordon-Phelps  manner,  how- 
ever, unemployment  would increase  while prices and wages were higher 
than expected, violating  the usual rational expectations  behavior.  The 
best way around  this difficulty  is to build a rational  expectations  model 
with both internal and external  prices, letting temporary  deviations  in 
aggregate  supply  depend  differently  on which type of price is incorrectly 
predicted.  I will not do that,  but will reinterpret  prices  in the rational  ex- 
27.  Lucas, "Expectations  and the Neutrality of Money"; Sargent and Wallace, 
"Rational  Expectations";  and Barro, "Unanticipated  Money Growth." 
28. Stanley Fischer, "Long-Term  Contracts,  Rational Expectations,  and the Opti- 
mal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, vol. 85 (February 1977), 
pp. 191-205. 
29.  Edmund S. Phelps and John B. Taylor have an alternative  version of such a 
model, but it incorporates a whole aggregate demand system and is much more 
difficult  to use. See "Stabilizing  Powers of Monetary Policy Under Rational Expec- 
tations," Journal  of Political  Economy,  vol.  85  (February  1977),  pp.  163-90. 162  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity, 1:1979 
pectations  model  as only internal  prices,  and  will discuss  qualitatively  the 
types of results  that should  emerge  from such a model. 
The third  caveat  deals  with the relationship  between  aggregate  supply 
and unemployment.  The standard  rational expectations  model treats 
aggregate  supply  as fixed, and has actual output  vary around  aggregate 
supply according  to a set of terms representing  unexpected  changes  in 
macro  policy  and  a residual.  Because  supply  is fixed  and  demand  variable, 
the residual  is really  to be interpreted  as a demand  shock.  But  in this  paper 
I am interested  in the proper  response  to supply  residuals,  and for these 
it is clear  that supply-induced  drops  in actual  output  will also lower full- 
employment  output  in the short run, without  directly  raising  unemploy- 
ment.  I deal with this by adding  an explicit  relationship  explaining  cycli- 
cal unemployment. 
The  model  can  be expressed  in three  equations: 
(9)  Y =  Y* +  0.5c,(P  -  E_1P) +  0.5c,(P  -  EL2P) +  u 
(10)  Y=  c2M-P-v 
(11)  U-  U*  =  -c3(Y-  Y*  -  u). 
Here  the operator  E_i refers  to the expectation  of a variable  made  in the 
ith previous  period. Following the usual rational expectations  conven- 
tions, the entire  model  is in log form and all variables  (except the unem- 
ployment  rates) are  expressed  that  way.  Equation  9 is the modified  aggre- 
gate supply  equation  of Lucas, where Y* is defined  as the fixed normal 
long-term  level of output  and  P is defined  as the internal  price  level. Devi- 
ations  in actual  output  from Y* are made a positive  function  of misfore- 
casts in internal prices in t -  1  and t -  2, with the c1 coefficient giving the 
implied  short-term  elasticity.  I have formulated  the model as if all con- 
tracts  lasted  for two years,  so the 0.5 coefficients  reflect  the proportions  of 
price and wage contracts  signed in each year, which incorporate  that 
year's  expectations  about  internal  prices. 
Equation  10 is an aggregate  demand  equation  that  is here made  mone- 
tarist  for simplicity;  it would  be possible  to include  fiscal  variables  in 10, 
but that would add complexity  without  leading  to any additional  insights 
on how policy should  react.  Equation  11 then expresses  the link between 
aggregate  supply  and  the cyclical  unemployment  rate, U -  U* (not in log 
form). Percentage  rises  in Y above Y* will make  cyclical  unemployment 
negative  according  to the  coefficient  of Okun's  law,  c3. Edward  M. Gramlich  163 
The influence  of price shocks  of various  sorts  can then  be described  in 
terms  of the u and  v residuals.  Take  first  the Gordon-Phelps  supply  shock 
where  farm  output  is abruptly  lowered  by a crop failure.  This enters  the 
model as a direct  reduction  in Y, or a negative  u. Its direct  influence  on 
cyclical  unemployment  is neutralized  by including  u in equation  11. But 
there will be an indirect  influence  on both unemployment  and internal 
price  levels  working  through  the v term.  If spending  demands  for farm  out- 
put are price  inelastic,  the negative  u will raise the money income of the 
farm  sector,  raise  transactions  needs  for that  sector,  and  thus  imply  a posi- 
tive v. If the Federal  Reserve  does not accommodate  these transactions 
surprises,  the negative u must thus lower internal  price levels through 
equation  10. 
A second  type  of price  shock  could  be a pure  price  disturbance,  such  as 
a rise in the price  of internationally  traded  goods. This type of shock  will 
have no direct  influence  on real output (u =  0),  but if the demand  for 
imports  is price inelastic,  it will again  raise the transactions  demand  for 
money, and imply  that v >  0, thus tending  to lower internal  prices  for a 
given  M. Finally,  there  could be a shock that lowers output  without  any 
direct  effect  on internal  prices,  say with a drop  in productivity  or a strike. 
In this case output  is down,  u < 0, but there  is no direct  effect  on velocity 
and  v is equal  to zero. 
The model can be solved by substituting  equations  9 and 10 together 
to solve for P, taking  expectations,  and inserting  the calculated  expres- 
sions for  (P  -  E1P)  and  (P  -  E2P)  back into the expression for  Y. 
The reduced-form  equation  for Y becomes 
(12)  Y =  Y* +  O.5u  -  O.5civ +  1  - 0.5c  [c2(M -  E_1M) 
+  (1 +  cl)c2(M -  E_2M) +  EU1(u  +  v) +  (1 +  cl)E-2(u  +  v)]. 
This  expression  can  then  be inserted  into 10 and 1  1 to obtain  the reduced- 
form expression  for internal  price levels and unemployment.  It has the 
standard  rational  expectations  property  that real output  equals  its trend 
value, with a series of stochastic  terms  that were impossible  to forecast 
when price and wage contracts  were set, and with two terms  referring  to 
surprises  in monetary  policy. If the Federal Reserve had a one-period 
inside  lag and all contracts  had been signed  in the previous  year (all E-2 
terms  are absent), only unanticipated  monetary  changes  could influence 
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Fischer  showed,  if the inside  lag is one period  and some contracts  last for 
two periods, it is possible even for systematic  monetary changes to 
stabilize  output. 
Macro  or monetary  policy  is introduced  in the model  by writing  a reac- 
tion function  for the Federal  Reserve.  Assuming  again  that it has a one- 
period  inside  lag, it can set monetary  policy only on the basis  of informa- 
tion from  the previous  period.  If there  is no serial  correlation  of residuals, 
even this is impossible  because it has no information  about the present 
period.  But if there  is serial correlation,  an equation  expressing  the be- 
havior  of the  Federal  Reserve  is 
(13)  M  =  M* +  c4u-1 +  cv-1, 
where  M* is a predetermined  trend  amount  and the c4 and  c5 coefficients 
determine  in general  how the Federal  Reserve  should  respond  to shocks. 
Using  another  basic  assumption  of rational  expectations,  the  private  sector 
can be assumed  to know both the Federal  Reserve's  reaction  coefficients 
and  all the  information  it has;  no residual  monetary  surprises  are  assumed. 
The model can be solved by substituting  13 into 12 and minimizing 
some loss function  of the policymaker.  The loss function  minimized  by 
Fischer  depended  simply  on the variance  of Y around  Y*, but to preserve 
the spirit  of this  paper,  I should  make  it depend  on U and  also include  an 
inflation  term.  At that point, some of the simplifications  I have made to 
adjust  to the rational  expectations  model  become  troublesome.  One prob- 
lem is that the rational  expectations  loss function  includes  only unantici- 
pated inflation  rates (P -  E2P)  because  all anticipated  inflation  has al- 
ready been adjusted  for in previous price and wage contracts  and is 
therefore  costless (an assumption  that does not square  with my survey 
results  described  above). Another  serious  problem  is that the price  levels 
that  enter  the rational  expectations  model  are  only  internal  prices,  and  any 
external  inflation  is therefore  also viewed  as costless.  This makes  no logi- 
cal sense, so I will not present  a formal  optimal  policy exercise.  But it is 
possible to determine  qualitatively  how macro  policy should respond  to 
shocks  in the  rational  model. 
The simplest  case  is that  of a pure  quantity  disturbance,  such  as a dip  in 
productivity.  In this case u is less than  zero, but unemployment  does not 
rise (equation 11). There  is no direct  effect on internal  prices (v =  0), 
but as a result of the drop in Y, too much money is chasing too few 
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through  the aggregate  supply  expression.  If the Federal  Reserve  did noth- 
ing, inflation  would be up and unemployment  down, and both signals 
would suggest  that monetary  policy ought  to tighten.  The implication  of 
such a strategy  would be similar to the immediate  recession, or cold 
turkey,  policy described  for the standard  model. 
Next, take  the case of a pure  price  disturbance,  such as a rise in prices 
of imports  with  inelastic  demand.  As was said above,  v is positive  and  u is 
zero  in such  a case. The pure  price  disturbance  raises  the overall  inflation 
rate but, because of the positive v, internal  prices will be lowered and 
unemployment  raised.  The optimal  monetary  response  here depends  on 
that  great  unknown,  the social cost of unemployment  versus  that of infla- 
tion. For low b values,  the Federal  Reserve  will tighten  or not accommo- 
date;  for high b values  it will accommodate  this type of shock.  If the loss 
function  were  written  solely  in terms  of internal  inflation  rates,  the  Federal 
Reserve  would  unambiguously  accommodate  this shock,  showing  exactly 
why  that  approach  is not  fruitful. 
The last case of a supply  shock  is the Gordon-Phelps  crop  failure,  the 
one with  which  the paper  began.  Because  u changes  along  with  v, this case 
appears  to be different  from  the pure  price  disturbance,  but  in fact  it is not. 
The reason  is that  the u change  is neutralized  in the unemployment  equa- 
tion, implying  no initial rise in unemployment.  While it is true that Y 
drops,  as in the case of the quantity  disturbance,  the fact that demand  for 
farm  products  is price  inelastic  assures  that  internal  prices  will also drop, 
and  that  unemployment  will eventually  rise  by this  indirect  channel.  Hence 
in this case, as in the standard  model,  the shock  will temporarily  increase 
both overall inflation  rates and unemployment  rates, and again put the 
Federal  Reserve  in the dilemma  it has had throughout  the paper.  It will 
either  accommodate  the shock or not, depending  on its view of the rela- 
tive  cost  of unemployment  versus  that  of inflation. 
At this level, then, the rational  expectations  responses  look much the 
same as those implied  by the standard  model. One new feature  emerges: 
If the Federal  Reserve's  inside  lag is long relative  to the contract  period,  it 
should not do anything  at all. But otherwise  the Federal Reserve will 
have to choose between  inflation  and unemployment  in the same tradi- 
tional  way. The main  difference  between  the rational  expectations  model 
and the standard  model is not in the direction  of the macro policy re- 
sponse,  but  in differences  in social  costs among  the  various  policies. 
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volve substantial  amounts  of inflation  or unemployment,  persisting  over a 
substantial  length  of time.  But in the rational  model  these  differences,  and 
indeed  the social costs of a shock, are negligible:  as soon as last year's 
round  of wage contracts  has lapsed, expectations  become rational  again 
and past price shocks become irrelevant  in determining  future  levels of 
both  output  and  prices. 
Implications 
Perhaps  the most important  result  of this examination  of supply  price 
shocks  in the standard  model  is that  whatever  the macro  response,  shocks 
are very costly. If their unemployment  impact is minimized  by accom- 
modating  policies,  the shock-induced  inflation  can  linger  for several  years. 
If their inflationary  impact  is minimized  by an immediate  recession,  the 
cost in terms  of high unemployment  is sizable.  Various  intermediate  ap- 
proaches are possible, but all result in some combination  of persistent 
unemployment,  persistent  inflation,  or both. If nothing  else, this drama- 
tizes the need for policies other  than macro  responses  to minimize  price 
shocks. 
But it may be that such policies cannot  be designed,  and that macro 
authorities  will have  to live with  exogenous  price  shocks.  Then  the choice 
of macro policy responses  to shocks  cannot  easily  be divorced  from the 
question  of where  the economy  should  have  been before  the shock.  It can 
be shown  theoretically  that in a simple  model in which  the policymaking 
horizon  is infinite,  the parameters  of both the behavioral  model and the 
social loss function  are constant,  and optimality  was initially  achieved,  it 
will be optimal  for policy to accommodate  the shock and  prevent  the un- 
employment  rate from changing.  Because there appears  to be little evi- 
dence of shifts  either  in behavioral  or social loss coefficients,  that model 
may  be a reasonable  first  approximation  to reality.  Accommodation  pol- 
icies are thus likely to be less costly, though  by margins  that vary from 
small  to large  under  different  interpretations  of the marginal  social costs 
of unemployment  and  inflation. 